

To Permanent Representatives of Member and Observer States of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council (Geneva, Switzerland)

24 August 2026

Burundi: The Human Rights Council should further extend the Special Rapporteur's mandate

Excellencies,

As human rights violations continue to be committed in Burundi in a context of widespread impunity, and as the country is in the middle of an electoral cycle that will culminate in the 2027 presidential election and risks closing remaining avenues for peaceful expression of dissent, the UN Human Rights Council should maintain its scrutiny of the country's situation.

Ahead of the Council's 63rd session (7 September-7 October 2026), we, the undersigned civil society organisations, write to stress the importance of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burundi and urge your delegation to support a new extension of his mandate.

In resolution 60/15,¹ adopted in October 2025, the Council condemned a range of human rights violations and abuses committed in Burundi, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detentions, acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and sexual and gender-based violence, as well as “widespread impunity,” and deplored the “reduced space for civil society, citizen activism, independent media, [and] political participation.”

In addition to those mentioned in Council resolutions,² human rights violations in Burundi include inhumane detention conditions, including as a result of prison overcrowding and abuse,³ prolonged detentions due to a complete disregard for basic due process guarantees, with political prisoners remaining incarcerated despite having been acquitted or having served their sentence in full,⁴ violations of the rights of returning refugees, and violations of economic, social and cultural rights.

¹ Available at: <https://docs.un.org/A/HRC/RES/60/15>

² Also see civil society letters to the Council, including DefendDefenders et al., “Burundi: As risk factors multiply, it is imperative to extend the Special Rapporteur's mandate,” 20 August 2025, <https://defenddefenders.org/burundi-risk-factors-extend-sr-mandate/>; “At a critical juncture for Burundi, the Special Rapporteur's mandate remains vital,” 29 August 2024, <https://defenddefenders.org/critical-juncture-burundi-sr-mandate-vital/>; “Burundi: Extend the Special Rapporteur's mandate and ensure adequate funding for his monitoring and documentation work,” 25 August 2023, <https://defenddefenders.org/burundi-extend-sr-mandate-ensure-funding/> (all accessed on 15 July 2026).

³ As of early 2026, some prisons record occupancy rates of between 500% (Mpimba) and over 1,000% (Muramvya), with multiple violations associated with overcrowding, shortages of water and food, squalid conditions, and abuse. See “Prisons burundaises: 12 938 détenus pour 4 294 places, soit 301 % d'occupation, ACAT-Burundi donne l'alerte,” 30 April 2026, <https://focode.org/focodemag/focodemag3004264> (accessed on 16 July 2026).

High-profile detainees are not spared. Instead, they seem to be subjected to cruel or degrading treatment. For example, Dr. Christophe Sahabo, a former Director of Kira Hospital, detained since April 2022, has been repeatedly denied access to adequate medical care (see Amnesty International, “Burundi: Further information: Convicted doctor's life in danger in detention: Christophe Sahabo,” 21 October 2025, <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/documents/afr16/0378/2025/en/>). Also see ACAT-Burundi, “Rapport annuel sur la situation des droits de l'Homme, Édition 2025,” <https://www.acatburundi.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Rapport-annuel-ACAT-Burundi-2025.pdf> (all accessed on 16 July 2026).

⁴ Several detainees remain detained despite serving their sentence or benefiting from presidential pardons. For instance, despite the full execution of his sentence in November 2021, as of June 2026 Dieudonné Dushimagize, a former colonel, remained detained in Bubanza prison. Some persons have also been held in unofficial places of detention, such as SNR premises, without any judicial oversight. This is the case of, among others, Diomède Barikunda, a former Director of Human Resources at the Ministry of Public Health. See ACAT-Burundi, “Libération des détenus : ACAT-Burundi appelle à l'équité et à la transparence,” 19 February 2026, <https://www.acatburundi.org/liberation-des-detenus-acat-burundi-appelle-a-lequite-et-a-la-transparence/> (accessed on 16 July 2026).

Additionally, in resolution 60/15, the Council recalled that “the States members of the Human Rights Council shall uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights and shall fully cooperate with the Council and its mechanisms.” This echoed civil society’s concerns over the Burundian Government’s refusal to meaningfully cooperate with the Council’s mechanisms, including the Special Rapporteur, in violation of its Membership obligations.⁵ The voting result on the resolution (23 votes in favour, nine against (including Burundi itself), with 15 abstentions) showed broad, cross-regional support for ongoing scrutiny of the country’s human rights situation.

One year on, the human rights situation in Burundi remains bleak. In recent months, cases of enforced disappearances following abductions by state and para-state actors, namely members of law enforcement and security forces, including the police and National Intelligence Service (SNR), and members of the ruling National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) party’s youth league, known as the *Imbonerakure*, have been documented. The use of unidentified vehicles, the lack of information about places of detention, and the threats made against victims’ families reflect the Burundian authorities’ desire to create a climate of fear and evade any form of accountability.

Following the 25 February 2026 disappearance of an Independent National Human Rights Commission (CNIDH) employee, Chadia Mukaremera, senior officials of the institution requested that its Secretary-General, Chantal Bakamiriza, not be allowed to leave Burundi. They cited the many unanswered questions surrounding their colleague’s disappearance.⁶

Dead bodies are found on the streets or outside towns. Local officials usually order burials in the absence of investigations, in violation of the Criminal Code. Extrajudicial executions and physical attacks have targeted real or perceived opponents,⁷ as well as public officials. On 16 April 2026, Communications Minister Gabby Bugaga was found dead in his car, which was immobilised in a palm plantation on the outskirts of Bujumbura. Witnesses described an unusual scene, which raised numerous questions around the authorities’ classification of the case as an “accident.”⁸ These developments are reminiscent of the extrajudicial executions committed in 2015-2016, following the eruption of the still unresolved crisis that led the Council to create a Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Burundi, in 2016.⁹

Burundians who had sought refuge abroad face forced repatriation. In 2026, Tanzanian authorities further increased their pressure on, and used violence against, Burundians by destroying shelters in Zone 13 of Nyarugusu Camp and closing Nduta Camp, in violation of their non-refoulement obligations¹⁰ and of the

⁵ DefendDefenders et al., “Burundi: As risk factors multiply, it is imperative to extend the Special Rapporteur’s mandate,” op. cit.

⁶ FOCODE, “Affaire Chadia Mukaremera : cinq cadres de la CNIDH demandent que Chantal Bakamiriza ne soit pas autorisée à quitter le Burundi,” 13 June 2026, <https://focode.org/focodemag/focodemag1306263>; Radio Publique Africaine (RPA), “Burundi : des cadres de la CNIDH demandent la suspension d’une mission à l’étranger de la Secrétaire générale, dans le cadre de l’enquête sur la disparition de leur collègue Chadia Mukaremera,” 15 June 2026, <https://www.rpa.bi/index.php/actualites/4justice/burundi-des-cadres-de-la-cnidh-demandent-la-suspension-d-une-mission-a-l-etranger-de-la-secretaire-generale-dans-le-cadre-de-l-enquete-sur-la-disparition-de-leur-collegeue-chadia-mukaremera> (both accessed on 15 July 2026).

⁷ See Burundi Human Rights League “Iteka,” “Report on the human rights situation in Burundi on the eve of the presidential election,” June 2025-May 2026, <https://ligue-iteka.bi/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/REPORT-JUNE-2025-MAY-2026.pdf> (accessed on 16 July 2026).

⁸ RFI, “Burundi: de nombreuses questions autour de la mort de Gabby Bugaga, ministre de la Communication,” 16 April 2026, <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20260416-burundi-de-nombreuses-questions-autour-de-la-mort-de-gabby-bugaga-ministre-de-la-communication>; SOS Médias Burundi, “Burundi: death of the Minister of Media and Communication Gabby Bugaga in troubled circumstances,” 18 April 2026, <https://www.sosmediasburundi.org/en/2026/04/18/burundi-death-of-the-minister-of-media-and-communication-gabby-bugaga-in-troubled-circumstances/> (both accessed on 16 July 2026).

⁹ See <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/co-i-burundi/co-i-burundi>

¹⁰ “Joint Statement on the Imminent Closure of Nduta Camp and the Forced Repatriation of Burundian Refugees from Tanzania,” 23 April 2026, available at: <https://www.fiacat.org/en/media-press/press-releases/3357-joint-statement-on-the-imminent-closure-of-nduta-camp-and-the-forced-repatriation-of-burundian-refugees-from-tanzania>; also see UN News, “Le rapatriement forcé de réfugiés burundais depuis la Tanzanie inquiète le HCR,” 25 February 2026, <https://news.un.org/fr/story/2026/02/1158468> (both accessed on 16 July 2026).

principle of voluntary, safe and dignified return and sustainable reintegration. Upon their arrival in Burundi, returnees faced confiscation of their belongings and fears for their safety.

Like the overwhelming majority of the Burundian population, they also faced violations of economic, social and cultural rights in a context of socioeconomic crisis, shortages, and inflation. Ligue Iteka referred to the conditions Burundians face as those of a “survival economy.”¹¹ At the time of writing, 87% of the Burundian population lived on less than 1.90 US dollars a day, making Burundi the world’s poorest country.¹² The country continued to face shortages of foreign currencies, fuel, fertilisers, and commodities affecting several key sectors and contributing to rampant inflation.¹³ These issues are compounded by state decisions and interventions in the economy, including the closure, since 2024, of the country’s land borders with Rwanda, and severe restrictions on the sale and marketing of maize, which forces producers to hand over their production to a public agency, ANAGESSA, often at low prices and with delayed payments.¹⁴

In addition to the agricultural sector, the health and education sectors have been severely affected. Rising costs of living, low salaries, delays in payments by the state, shortages of medicines, and an overall lack of opportunities have led thousands of doctors and teachers to leave the country to seek better work conditions. The phenomenon of teacher desertions has been accelerating, fuelled by salaries that are insufficient to meet basic needs and the deterioration of Burundi’s education system due to poor governance.¹⁵ Due to both despair and severe restrictions on civic space, teachers no longer express their demands as they used to (through strikes and other forms of collective action to denounce their working conditions), but rather quit silently. This exodus of skilled workers and state neglect has resulted in violations of Burundians’ rights to health and education, including through an absence of service provision.

These socioeconomic issues are compounded by the country’s territorial reorganisation, which forces many Burundians to travel long distances to obtain administrative documents, costing them considerable time and resources,¹⁶ and by the ongoing impact of the conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).¹⁷

¹¹ Burundi Human Rights League “Iteka,” “Report on the human rights situation in Burundi,” op. cit., p. 7.

¹² See International Labour Organization, “Burundi” (Country Profile), <https://www.social-protection.org/gimi/ShowCountryProfile.action?iso=BI> (as of 16 July 2026). Nearly 80% of the population lives in multi-dimensional poverty (The Borgen Project, “Everything You Need To Know About Poverty in Burundi,” 22 March 2026, <https://borgenproject.org/about-poverty-in-burundi/> (accessed on 16 July 2026)).

¹³ SOS Médias Burundi, “Bujumbura plunges back into fuel shortage : the black market booms,” 15 December 2025, <https://www.sosmediasburundi.org/en/2025/12/15/bujumbura-plunges-back-into-fuel-shortage-the-black-market-booms/>; “Burundi : shortages, exodus, arbitrary detentions... bishops issue a harsh indictment,” 11 June 2026, <https://www.sosmediasburundi.org/en/2026/06/11/burundi-shortages-exodus-arbitrary-detentions-bishops-issue-a-harsh-indictment/> (accessed on 16 July 2026). Regarding inflation, see Institut National de la Statistique du Burundi, “Indice des prix à la consommation des ménages au Burundi ; mois de mars 2026,” 13 April 2026, <https://api.insbu.bi/storage/documents/01KP5BX08PYRM93KEA6J55NNMJ.pdf> (accessed on 15 July 2026).

¹⁴ Burundi Human Rights League “Iteka,” “Report on the human rights situation in Burundi,” op. cit., p. 34.

¹⁵ Burundi Human Rights League “Iteka,” “Report on the human rights situation in Burundi,” op. cit., pp. 34-37; Iwacu, “Jusqu’où ira la désertion des enseignants ?,” 2 March 2026, <https://www.iwacu-burundi.org/jusquou-ira-la-desertion-des-enseignants/>; SOS Médias Burundi, “Burundi : la fuite des enseignants met à genoux le système scolaire,” 21 January 2026, <https://www.sosmediasburundi.org/2026/01/21/burundi-la-fuite-des-enseignants-met-a-genoux-le-systeme-scolaire/>; TV5 Monde, “Burundi : les hôpitaux se vident de leurs médecins,” 19 September 2023, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CDdF5CS-MLw>; RFI, “Burundi: des mesures pour encourager les médecins à ne pas partir à l’étranger,” 11 May 2025, <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250511-burundi-des-mesures-pour-encourager-les-medecins-a-ne-pas-partir-a-l-etranger> (all accessed on 16 July 2026).

¹⁶ Burundi Human Rights League “Iteka,” “Report on the human rights situation in Burundi,” op. cit., p. 5.

¹⁷ Development & Cooperation, “Burundi’s refugee camps overwhelmed after new fighting in the DRC,” 23 February 2026, <https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/renewed-violence-drc-refugees-burundi> (accessed on 16 July 2026). As of July 2026, Burundi hosted over 100,000 forcibly displaced people, including approximately 91,000 refugees and asylum seekers – mainly from the DRC (UNHCR, “Burundi,” <https://www.unhcr.org/where-we-work/countries/burundi> (accessed on 16 July 2026)).

Against this backdrop, independent actors and critical voices, including human rights defenders (HRDs), anti-corruption activists, journalists and media professionals, face severe constraints as the ruling CNDD-FDD party is moving to completely close the country's civic space.

In recent months, journalists have faced intimidation for reporting on a range of issues, including the distribution of agricultural products, a European Commissioner's visit to Burundi, enforcement of a court ruling in a land dispute, or Burundi's military involvement in the DRC.¹⁸ The release of Sandra Muhoza, in February 2026, after she had been sentenced to four years in prison¹⁹ for "undermining the integrity of the national territory" and "racial aversion," does not undermine Reporters Without Borders' analysis²⁰ of how the Burundian media has been systematically weakened since the start of the 2015 crisis, including through arbitrary arrests, detentions, intimidation, threats and attacks.

Those HRDs who remain in the country face significant risks and threats, including from senior political figures. Since late December 2025, Vianney Ndayisaba, President of the Association for the Fight Against Unemployment and Torture (ALUCHOTO), received threats and escaped an attempted kidnapping after he denounced the sending of Burundian women and girls to Gulf countries with the alleged complicity of high-ranking security officials and civil servants, as well as other abuses. On 5 November 2025, President Évariste Ndayishimiye publicly attacked Faustin Ndikumana, representative of the NGO PAR-CEM, by insulting him and likening him to "demons."²¹

In a decision published in December 2025, the UN Committee Against Torture found that Burundi subjected lawyers to reprisals, including disbarment and seizure of property, for cooperating with the Committee. The Committee urged Burundi to take immediate steps to remedy the violations, including restoring the complainants' law licences, reversing all professional bans, restoring their property rights, providing full redress to the complainants, and ensuring that no similar violations occur in the future.²² This was an official confirmation, by a UN body, that Burundi had engaged in reprisals.

In a context where the space for public gatherings not endorsed by the ruling party is extremely limited,

¹⁸ See Ligue burundaise des droits de l'Homme "Iteka," "Bulletin hebdomadaire Iteka n° 501 du 17 au 23 novembre 2025," November 2025, <https://ligue-iteka.bi/index.php/2025/11/26/bulletin-hebdomadaire-iteka-nijambo-n501/>; EU See, "Arrest of five journalists reinforce a climate of fear and self-censorship within the media," 5 March 2026, <https://eusee.hivos.org/alert/arrest-of-five-journalists-reinforce-a-climate-of-fear-and-self-censorship-within-the-media/>; SOS Médias Burundi, "One article, nine hours of interrogation: Independent press faces the SNR," 23 December 2025, <https://www.sosmediasburundi.org/en/2025/12/28/one-article-nine-hours-of-interrogation-independent-press-faces-the-snr/> (all accessed on 16 July 2026).

¹⁹ Reporters Without Borders (RSF), "Burundi: Sandra Muhoza free at last!," 13 April 2026, <https://rsf.org/en/burundi-sandra-muhoza-free-last> (accessed on 16 April 2026). The Ngozi High Court's sentence against Sandra Muhoza was nearly twice as long as the one originally handed down to her in 2024, and had been rendered after multiple postponements. The only woman journalist detained in Sub-Saharan Africa, she had been in detention since April 2024 following opaque legal proceedings. See RSF, "Burundi: four-year prison sentence for Sandra Muhoza, the only woman journalist detained in sub-Saharan Africa," 14 January 2026, <https://rsf.org/en/burundi-four-year-prison-sentence-sandra-muhoza-only-woman-journalist-detained-sub-saharan-africa>; SOS Médias Burundi, "Ngozi : journalist Sandra Muhoza back in court, her lawyers demand her provisional release," 7 October 2025, <https://www.sosmediasburundi.org/en/2025/10/09/ngozi-journalist-sandra-muhoza-back-in-court-her-lawyers-demand-her-provisional-release/> (all accessed on 16 July 2026).

²⁰ RSF, "What it's like to be a journalist in Africa's Great Lakes region': new RSF report throws spotlight on journalists in conflict-struck zone," March 2026, <https://rsf.org/en/what-its-be-journalist-africa-s-great-lakes-region-new-rsf-report-throws-spotlight-journalists> (accessed on 16 July 2026).

²¹ See SOS Médias Burundi, "Climate of terror in Burundi: Vianney Ndayisaba escapes gunmen after his denunciations," 8 January 2026, <https://www.sosmediasburundi.org/en/2026/01/08/climate-of-terror-in-burundi-vianney-ndayisaba-escapes-gunmen-after-his-denunciations/>; "Matongo : le président Ndayishimiye insulte Faustin Ndikumana et le compare à des ennemis de Dieu," 7 November 2025, <https://www.sosmediasburundi.org/2025/11/07/matongo-le-president-ndayishimiye-insulte-faustin-ndikumana-et-le-compare-a-des-ennemis-de-dieu/> (accessed on 16 July 2026).

²² "Burundi: Disbarring lawyers and appropriating property were reprisals for UN cooperation, committee finds," 23 December 2025, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/12/burundi-disbarring-lawyers-and-appropriating-property-were-reprisals-un> (accessed on 16 July 2026).

in February 2026, a distribution of fertilisers was suspended following a protest by farmers,²³ who denounced insufficient quantities, delivery delays, and a lack of equity in access to agricultural products. This incident showed the level of distrust between farmers and state officials, in a context of widespread violations of both civil and political and economic, social and cultural rights.

The 2025 legislative and communal elections saw the CNDD-FDD party win 96.5% of votes and all contested National Assembly seats, as well as almost every seat in commune-level elections.²⁴ The ruling party also won all seats in the July 2025 senatorial election, leading to a single-party upper house for the 2025-2030 tenure. Hill (“*collinaires*”) elections (held in August 2025) were also marred by multiple irregularities,²⁵ with CNDD-FDD officials and *Imbonerakure* members intimidating, harassing and threatening the population, and key opposition figures being barred from running. This near-complete control of state institutions by the CNDD-FDD party solidified a de facto one-party rule.

With the May 2027 presidential election approaching, ongoing tensions around the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR),²⁶ and the CNIDH’s unwillingness to fulfil its responsibilities and work independently,²⁷ risk factors of violations multiply. As outlined last year, several of the UN Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes’ “Risk Factors” are present in Burundi.²⁸ With the ruling party closing not only avenues for peaceful transition through competitive, free and fair elections, but also all avenues for citizens to peacefully express dissent, these risk factors are further increasing. With the consolidation of the CNDD-FDD’s grip on powers and institutions, the Arusha Agreement, including its provisions designed to safeguard multi-party politics, is being completely dismantled.²⁹

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Burundi’s human rights situation remains of serious concern. Ten years after the creation of the COI, which followed the outbreak of the still unresolved 2015 crisis, no structural reforms have addressed long-standing human rights, governance, justice, and rule of law concerns. In the absence of progress, and in light of ongoing violations and impunity, we consider that there is no basis to depart from the Council’s current approach. Until measurable and sustainable progress on key human rights issues of

²³ SOS Médias Burundi, “Bururi : FOMI fertilizer distribution suspended amid farmer protests,” 12 February 2026, <https://www.sosmediasburundi.org/en/2026/02/14/bururi-fomi-fertilizer-distribution-suspended-amid-farmer-protests/> (accessed on 16 July 2026).

²⁴ See DefendDefenders et al., “Burundi: As risk factors multiply, it is imperative to extend the Special Rapporteur’s mandate,” op. cit.

²⁵ Iwacu, “Elections collinaires de 2025 : N’y a-t-il pas d’autres réalités cachées ?,” 30 August 2025, <https://www.iwacu-burundi.org/elections-collinaires-de-2025-ny-a-t-il-pas-dautres-realites-cachees/> (accessed on 17 July 2026).

²⁶ The CVR has been accused of leading selective investigations. Its methodology has been denounced by national and international actors, including the COI on Burundi. The CVR has had an almost exclusive focus on the Hutu victims of 1972 massacres and has included few Tutsi victims in its investigations. It has failed, for instance, to dedicate significant attention to 1993 massacres against the Tutsi or to the civil war period. Similar concerns surround the launch of Rondera FM radio station, in June 2026, as some fear that the station, under the guise of teaching history, will sow division instead of promoting unity. At the launch, Rondera FM’s director referred to some Burundians as “enemies of the nation,” in reference to the events of 2015.

See SOS-Torture/Burundi, “Renouveler le mandat de la CVR et ses membres dans un climat politique apaisé,” 20 November 2021, https://sostortureburundi.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Bulletin_de_justice_n40_20_11_21.pdf; Radio Publique Africaine, “Rondera FM inaugurée à Buhiga : des habitants redoutent que l’enseignement de l’histoire ne favorise la division,” 28 June 2026, <https://www.rpa.bi/index.php/actualites/politique/rondera-fm-inauguree-a-buhiga-des-habitants-redoutent-que-l-enseignement-de-l-histoire-ne-favorise-la-division> (both accessed on 17 July 2026).

²⁷ See DefendDefenders et al., “Burundi: As risk factors multiply, it is imperative to extend the Special Rapporteur’s mandate,” op. cit.

²⁸ See Ibid.; DefendDefenders et al., “At a critical juncture for Burundi, the Special Rapporteur’s mandate remains vital,” op. cit. (as well as the letter’s Annex listing risk factors).

²⁹ See Lewis Mudge and Antoine Kaburahe (via Human Rights Watch), “Bye-bye Arusha Accords as Burundi solidifies one-party rule,” 2 September 2025, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/09/02/bye-bye-arusha-accords-as-burundi-solidifies-one-party-rule>; Tigere Chagutah (via Amnesty International), “Ten Years On: Reflections on the Silent Crisis in Burundi,” 9 July 2025, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/07/ten-years-on-reflections-on-the-silent-crisis-in-burundi/> (both accessed on 16 July 2026).

concern, including addressing impunity for past and ongoing violations, has been made, the Council should ensure continued scrutiny of Burundi's human rights situation.

In light of previous cycles of abuse prior to, during, and after elections, the international community should ensure continued scrutiny of Burundi's situation, preserving the Special Rapporteur's documentation role and his ability to report to the Council, at least twice a year.

At its 63rd session, the Council should adopt a resolution that fully reflects concerns over Burundi's human rights situation and:

- **Extends the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burundi;**
- **Requests the Special Rapporteur to present to the Human Rights Council, at its 65th session, an oral update on the situation of human rights in Burundi, and also to submit to the Council, at its 66th session, and to the General Assembly, at its 82nd session, a comprehensive report;**
- **Reaffirms that all States Members of the Human Rights Council shall uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights and fully cooperate with the Council and its mechanisms, and urges Burundi to be mindful of these standards;**
- **Urges the Government of Burundi to cooperate fully with the Special Rapporteur, including by granting him access to the country and by providing him with all the information necessary to properly fulfil his mandate;**
- **Urges the Government of Burundi to constructively cooperate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in particular its regional office for Central Africa, and to present a timeline for the reopening of its country office in Burundi; and**
- **Requests the United Nations Secretary-General to provide the Special Rapporteur with the assistance and all resources necessary to fulfil his mandate.**

We thank you for your attention to these pressing issues and stand ready to provide your delegation with further information as required.

Sincerely,

1. Abacu Bari He ? (*"Where are our family members?"*)
2. ACAT-Burundi
3. AfricanDefenders (Pan-African Human Rights Defenders Network)
4. ASD-INKINGI
5. Association Panafricaine pour la Protection des Droits Humains et des Personnes Détenues (A.PRO.D.H)
6. Burkinabè Human Rights Defenders Coalition (CBDDH)
7. Burundian Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CB-CPI)
8. Burundian Human Rights Defenders Coalition (CBDDH)
9. Centre pour le Renforcement de l'Éducation et du Développement de la Jeunesse (CREDEJ)
10. CIVICUS
11. CNCD-11.11.11
12. Coalition pour la Défense des Droits Humains / Vivant dans les Camps de Réfugiés (CDH/VICAR)
13. Collectif des Avocats pour la Défense des Victimes de Crimes de Droit International au Burundi (CAVIB)
14. DefendDefenders (East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project)
15. EurAc (Europe-Central Africa Network)
16. Fondation Rester Debout pour la Paix (FOREDEPA)
17. Forum pour la Conscience et le Développement (FOCODE)
18. Forum pour le Renforcement de la Société Civile (FORSC)
19. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P)
20. Hawai'i Institute for Human Rights

21. Human Rights Watch
22. INAMAHORO Movement
23. International Federation of ACAT (FIACAT)
24. International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
25. International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT)
26. International Service for Human Rights (ISHR)
27. King Umurundi Freedom (KUF-ASBL)
28. Lawyers' Rights Watch Canada
29. Light For All
30. Ligue Iteka
31. Movement of Women and Girls for Peace and Security in Burundi (MFFPS)
32. Network of Human Rights Defenders in Central Africa (REDHAC)
33. Pax Christi International
34. Refugee Rights Action Organization (RRAO)
35. Réseau des Citoyens Probes (RCP)
36. SOS-Torture/Burundi
37. Together for the Support to Human Rights Defenders in Danger (ESDDH)
38. Tournons la Page Burundi
39. West African Human Rights Defenders Network (ROADDH/WAHRDN)
40. World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT)